A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

Distributive Justice
(New York, Bobbs-Merrill,
1966), pp. 35–38.
279
49. Comparison with Mixed Conceptions

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difference principle is a relatively precise conception, since it ranks all
combinations of objectives according to how well they promote the pros-
pects of the least favored.
Thus despite the fact that the difference principle seems offhand to be
a somewhat special conception, it may still be the criterion which when
adjoined to the other principles of justice stands in the background and
controls the weights expressed in our everyday judgments as these would
be matched by various mixed principles. Our customary way of relying
on intuition guided by lower-order standards may obscure the existence
of more basic principles that account for the force of these criteria. Of
course, whether the two principles of justice, and especially the differ-
ence principle, explicate our judgments of distributive justice can only be
decided by developing the consequences of these principles in some
detail and noting how far we are prepared to accept the weights to which
they lead. Possibly there will be no conflict between these consequences
and our considered convictions. Certainly there should be none with those
judgments that are fixed points, ones that we seem unwilling to revise
under any foreseeable circumstances. Otherwise the two principles are
not fully acceptable and some revision has to be made.
But perhaps our everyday views do not entail anything very definite
about the problem of balancing competing ends. If so, the main question
is whether we can assent to the far more exact specification of our con-
ception of justice which the two principles represent. Provided that cer-
tain fixed points are preserved, we have to decide the best way to fill in
our conception of justice and to extend it to further cases. The two
principles of justice may not so much oppose our intuitive convictions as
provide a relatively concrete principle for questions that common sense
finds unfamiliar and leaves undecided. Thus while the difference princi-
ple strikes us as strange at first, reflection upon its implications when it is
suitably circumscribed may convince us that it either accords with our
considered judgments, or else projects these convictions to new situations
in an acceptable way.
In line with these remarks, we may note that it is a political convention
of a democratic society to appeal to the common interest. No political