1. Ekologik muammolar va iqtisodiy samaradorlik. Mulk huquqlari va samarali bozor taqsimoti

4. Resurs uchun raqobat
Exclusivity is one of the chief characteristics of an efficient property rights structure. This characteristic is frequently violated in practice. One broad class of violations occurs when an agent making a decision does not bear all of the consequences of his or her action.

O’ziga xoslik bu samarali mulk huquqlari tuzilishida asosiy xususiyatlardan biri hisoblanadi. Bu xusussiyat amaliyotda tez tez buziladi. Buzilishlarning bir keng sinfi agent qaror qabul qilganda uning harakatlari hamma oqibatlariga chidamaganda shakllanadi.

Suppose two firms are located by a river. The first produces steel, while the second, somewhat downstream, operates a resort hotel. Both use the river, although in different ways. The steel firm uses it as a recipient for its waste, while the hotel uses it to attract customers seeking water recreation. If these two facilities have different owners, an efficient use of the water is not likely to result. Because the steel plant does not bear the cost of reduced business at the resort resulting from waste being dumped into the river, it is not likely to be very sensitive to that cost in its decision making. As a result, it could be expected to dump too much waste into the river, and an efficient allocation of the river would not be attained.
Deylik ikki firma daryo bo’yida joylashgan. Birinchisipo’lat ishlab chiqaradi, biroz oimga qarab pastga, ikkinchisi kurort mehmonxonani boshqaradi. Har ikkisi ham daryodan foydalanadi,albatta turli yo’llar bilan. Mehmonxona suvda hordiq chiqarishni izlayotgan istemilchilarni o’ziga jalb qilish uchun ishlatayotgan bir paytda, po’lat firmasi chiqindilarini oluvchi sifatida ishlatadi. Agar ikki imkoniyatni egalari turli bo’lsa, suvdan foydalanish natijasi ehtimol samarali bo’lmaydi.
Natijada, daryoga juda ko’p chiqindilar ag’darilishini kutilishi mumkin va daryoning samarali taqsimlanishiga erishilmagan.
This situation is an externality. An externality exists whenever the welfare of some agent, either a firm or household, depends not only on his or her activities, but also on activities under the control of some other agent. In the example, the increased waste in the river imposed an external cost on the resort, a cost the steel firm could not be counted upon to consider appropriately in deciding the amount of waste to dump.
Bu holat eksternalitlar hisoblanadi. Eksternalitlik qachonlardir bazi bir agentlarning farovonligida mavjud bo’lgan, xoh firma xoh uy xo’jaligi bo’lsin faqatgina uning faoliyatiga bog’liq bo’lmaydi, lekin shuningdek, boshqa bir agentning nazorati ostidagi faoliyatda. Misolda, daryoda ko’paygan chiqindi kurortning tashqi xarajatiga yuklangan ------------
The effect of this external cost on the steel industry is illustrated in Figure 3.4, which shows the market for steel. Steel production inevitably involves producing pollution as well as steel. The demand for steel is shown by the demand curve D, and the private marginal cost of producing the steel (exclusive of pollution control and damage) is depicted as MC_p. Because society considers both the cost of pollution and the cost of producing the steel, the social marginal cost function (MC_s) includes both of these costs as well.
Po’lat sanoatidagi bu tashqi xarajat 3.4 grafikda tasvirlangan, po’lat bozorini ko’rsatadi.Po’lat ishlab chiqarish po’lat shuningdek, muqarrar ifloshlanish ishlab chiqarishini o’z ichiga oladi. Po’latga talab D egri talab chizig’I orqali ko’rsatilgan va po’lat ishlab chiqarish xususiy marjinal xarajati ( alohida ifloslanish nazorati va zarari) MC_P ko’rinishida tasvirlangan. Jamiyat ifloslanish ham va po’lat ishlab chiqarish xarajatlari ham ko’rib chiqqanligi sababli, ijtimoiy marjinal xarajat funksiyasi (MC_S ) bu xarajatni ham o’z ichiga oladi.
If the steel industry faced no outside control on its emission levels, it would seek to produce Q_m. That choice, in a competitive setting, would maximize its private producer surplus. But that is clearly not efficient, since the net benefit is maximized at Q^*, not Q_m.

With the help of Figure 3.4 we can draw a number of conclusions about market allocations of commodities causing pollution externalities:

Agar po’lar sanoati o’zining emissiya darajalarida hech qanday tashqi nazoratga duch kelmasa, bunda Q_m ishlab chiqarish uchun harakat qilinadi. Bu tanlovda raqobat muhitida, xususiy ishlab chiqarish ortiqchaligi eng yuqori drajaga yetadi. Lekin bu aniq samarali emas, shundan beri sof foyda Q^x da maksimallashadi, Q_m da emas.

Biz 3.4 grafik yordamida ifloshlanish eksternalitlariga sabab bo’lgan tovarlarning bozor taqsimoti haqida bir nechta xulosalarni keltirishimiz mumkin:

1. 
   Tovar ishlab chiqarish juda katta;
   
2. 
   Juda ko’p ifloshlanish ishlab chiqarilmoqda;
   
3. 
   Ifloshlanishga javobgar mahsulotlar narxi judapast;
   
4. 
   Tashqi xarajatlar qanchalik uzun bo’lsa ham bozor tomonidan joriy qilingan mahsulot birligiga kamroq ifloslanish keltirib chiqarishga yo’llar qidirishga hech qanday istak yo’q.
   
5. 
   Qayta ishlab chiqarish va ifloslantiruvchi moddalardan qayta foydalanish juda past, chunki atrof muhitga chiqarish shunchalik samarasiz arzondir.
   

1. The output of the commodity is too large.

2. Too much pollution is produced.

3. The prices of products responsible for pollution are too low.

4. As long as the costs are external, no incentives to search for ways to yield less pollution per unit of output are introduced by the market.

5. Recycling and reuse of the polluting substances are discouraged because release into the environment is so inefficiently cheap.